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Why Are We So Reluctant To “Execute” Microsoft?

possibility of structural relief. And, even when

R o b e rt H . L a n d e

they asked for it, they called it only a “reorgan-

O

On June 28, 2001, the D.C. Court of Appeals

ization.” Tellingly, one of Microsoft’s first sug-

held that Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws

gested changes to the government’s proposal

repeatedly, relentlessly, and over a multi-year

was that it be renamed a “divestiture.”

period. The court ruled eight separate times

Why are we afraid even to discuss in a

that Microsoft engaged in conduct that illegally

straightforward manner whether we should

maintained its monopoly in PC operating sys-

break up Microsoft? This is probably because

tems. Despite these strongly worded conclu-

of the legal fiction that a corporation is a “per-

sions concerning Microsoft’s liability, the court

son.”

was extremely cautious when it considered

This notion is deeply ingrained in the legal

whether to break up the company. It held that

profession, the business community, and soci-

divestiture was a “radical” remedy that should

ety at large. Courts have long held that corpo-

1

be imposed with “great caution.”

rations are legal “people” who are entitled to

Why this reluctance to order structural relief?

“due process”—in other words, corporations

Even people who condemn Microsoft’s conduct

have constitutional rights. Corporations have

and admit that it probably will continue to

names (even nicknames—who would want to

engage in predatory practices shudder at the

execute “Ma Bell”?), pay taxes, and are subject

idea that we should break it up: “Conduct relief

to most laws—just like real people. Moreover, a

of virtually any type, sure. Even a multi-billion

corporation is a very special type of person. In

m

dollar fine could be appropriate. But don’t even

theory a corporation is a person who cannot

Robert H. Lande is

think about structural relief. Don’t destroy

die; a corporation is an immortal.

Venable Professor of

Microsoft. Only a fool would execute a compa-

The court of appeals might well have rea-

Law, University of

ny that has made so many wonderful products.”

soned this way, at least subconsciously. In dis-

The government did not even dare to men-

cussing the conditions under which divestiture

and Senior Research

tion the term “structural relief” when it filed its

might be appropriate, it held: “If indeed

Scholar, American

suit. It merely asked for “such additional per-

Microsoft is a unitary company, division might

Baltimore School of Law,

Antitrust Institute.

manent relief as is necessary . . . .” Why the

very well require Microsoft to reproduce each of

The author is grateful to

omission? Perhaps shrewd government lawyers

these departments in each new entity . . .”2 The

Neil Averitt and Albert

knew that if they started the proceeding by

reference to the company as a possible unitary

Foer for suggestions on

explicitly admitting that the best way to achieve

entity rather than as a convenient grouping of

an earlier draft of this

justice was by doing the unthinkable they would

contracts, and the reference to the need for

piece, and to Samuel

be more likely to lose the case completely. The

reproduction following a divestiture, could well

Collings for research

judge might reason that if the only effective rem-

reflect more than a logical assessment of under-

assistance. All of the

edy for a violation was the corporate “death

lying economics.

opinions expressed in

penalty,” he would instead just let Microsoft off

In reality, of course, a corporation is not a

this article, however,

completely. Only after they spent years proving

conscious organic entity. It is just a series of

are solely those of

that Microsoft had repeatedly engaged in anti-

contracts between real people. It is nothing

the author.

competitive conduct did the enforcers raise the

more than formal and informal relationships

the antitrustsource

“Because a corporation

is just a convenient

m

www.antitrustsource.com m November 2001

2

between shareholders, employees, and other

value. No responsible member of our society

flesh-and-blood people, made for a variety of

would execute a flesh-and-blood person without

economic purposes. Some are long term.

certainty “beyond a reasonable doubt” that they

Others, however, are short-term or can be bro-

had engaged in a horrible crime like murder

ken by one party at will. These contracts, more-

(and many do not believe in capital punishment

over, are changing continuously.

even under these circumstances). It is likely that

Although a corporation can be immortal, in

many or most of us subconsciously apply these

fact corporations die every day. Corporations

requirements to the Microsoft case: we believe

also frequently sell divisions to other compa-

that it is only appropriate to break up Microsoft

nies, spin off divisions to form separate new

if we are virtually certain that it committed a

firms, and divest portions of themselves in the

crime as horrible as murder. And, of course,

aftermath of mergers. The very concept of a

even though Microsoft was convicted of eight

firm as an entity that shapes itself by decisions

separate antitrust violations, it did not murder

about doing things internally through a hierarchy

any real people and its crimes are not as clear-

or in the marketplace reflects the changeability

cut as murder. Therefore, we reason, they do not

that is at the heart of corporate existence. The

deserve to be executed.

shape of corporations is constantly in flux.

We have to remind ourselves that United

Antitrust is just another cause of this flux. A

States v. Microsoft is just a civil trial where the

court-ordered divestiture would constitute only

government is, rightly, required to prove its

a rearrangement of some of Microsoft’s con-

case only under a “more likely than not” stan-

it follows that it

tracts, but not the company’s literal “execution.”

dard. The antitrust laws forbid certain types of

Because a corporation is just a convenient

economic activity, and were in large part

should not have the

grouping of contracts, it follows that it should not

designed to give companies an incentive to

have the moral rights of a real person. Its share-

behave in the manner that is best for consumer

holders and employees have rights, of course,

welfare. The remedy for an antitrust violation is

but these will not necessarily be destroyed just

supposed to determine which arrangement of

because the corporation is divided into two or

contracts and contractual rights is best for soci-

more parts. Shareholder value and jobs should

ety. Microsoft has, of course, committed an anti-

not be needlessly reduced, but reasonable peo-

trust violation. If it is “more likely than not” that

ple differ as to whether the combined stock

the best way to achieve the goals of the reme-

value and employment levels of hypothetical

dy is through divestiture, the court should order

post-break up “baby Bills” would be more, or

divestiture. If conduct remedies are more like-

less, than the current total values. Regardless,

ly to be optimal, the court should proceed in

Microsoft did break the law repeatedly, and it

that direction. These are simply economic alter-

did accrue illegally gotten gains, so we should

natives that should be weighed against one

not be overly upset if its stock value decreases

another rationally.

grouping of contracts,

moral rights of a

real person.”

somewhat as a result of the remedy proceeding.

Moreover, the facts in the Microsoft case sug-

Moreover, shareholder value could decrease

gest that the corporation would be relatively sim-

even more as a result of a tough, protracted

ple to break up. Microsoft essentially consists of

conduct-based remedy. Regardless, a possi-

teams of immensely talented programmers and

ble decrease in shareholder value should not

a substantial body of intellectual property rights.

deter us from rationally discussing whether

All a court would have to do would be to rule that

Microsoft should be broken up.

certain of these people and some of this intel-

The divestiture issue is far more fundamental

lectual property now should be housed in par-

and emotion-laden than that of shareholder

ticular buildings and be part of company A,
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m

www.antitrustsource.com m November 2001

while others should be part of company B. This

3

through a series of conduct remedies.

situation is very much unlike that of United

However, many believe that Microsoft has

States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.3 In that

had a history of “interpreting” past court orders

celebrated case the court had to break up a

in a manner that made them ineffective. Many

monopoly that made all of its shoe machines in

simply do not trust Microsoft to live up to either

one factory. Compared to that situation, in

the letter or the spirit of the Stipulation. Many

Microsoft a structural solution is simple.

fully expect Microsoft to delay and circumvent

Further, meaningful conduct relief would be

this remedy.

likely to result in court oversight of many of

The parties’ agreement provides that if

Microsoft’s activities for years to come. It cer-

Microsoft violates the agreement, “the plaintiffs

tainly is possible to craft a tough package of

may apply to the Court for a one-time extension

effective conduct remedies that will not hamper

of this Final Judgment of up to two years,

4

the company’s ability to innovate. Yet, this

together with such other relief as the Court may

package is necessarily complex, lengthy,

deem appropriate .” 7 Assuming that Microsoft

regulatory in nature, and susceptible to being

does violate this Stipulation, the enforcers and

5

evaded. Even the settlement agreed to by

the court should reevaluate whether to impose

the Department of Justice, nine states, and

a structural remedy. They should do so using

Microsoft on November 6, 2001—which only

logic instead of emotion. They should decide

amounts to a slap on the wrist for Microsoft—will

upon the most appropriate relief considering

last for five years, with possibly a two-year

each option on its legal, economic, and admin-

6

extension. By contrast, structural relief would in

istrative merits, without anthropomorphizing. In

most ways be simpler, quicker, and less bur-

light of Microsoft’s evasions they will have to

densome. It also is likely to be more effective

reconsider the best way to make sure that this

and much more difficult to evade.

lawbreaker is deprived of the fruits of its illegal

Reasonable people certainly can differ as to

conduct, that competition is restored to the

whether the best, most pro-consumer, most pro-

affected market, and that Microsoft is prevented

innovation results in the Microsoft case are like-

from engaging in similar conduct. The best way

ly to arise from a conduct-based remedy, from

to do all of this is the most straightforward one.

dividing it into several corporations, or through

The court should break up Microsoft. v

a combination of methods. Divestiture, however, should not only be a last resort. It should be
a viable option that is considered logically on its

1 United

legal, administrative and economic merits, with-

2001).

out the influence of subconscious anthropo-

2 Id.

morphizing. It certainly should not be thought of

3 110

in moral terms and avoided at all costs lest we
engage in the reprehensible act of “killing”

States v. Microsoft, No. 00-5212, at 61 (D.C. Cir. June 28,

at 105.
F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521

(1954).
4 See

Conduct Remedies in the Microsoft Monopolization Litigation,

Paper Presented at AAI Press Briefing at the National Press Club

someone. It is in no respect the corporate equiv-

(Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org. The

alent of the death penalty.

American Antitrust Institute presented a white paper which called

On Sept. 6, 2001, the federal and state
enforcers pursuing the case announced they
would not ask the court to break up Microsoft.
On November 6, the Department of Justice, nine
states, and Microsoft agreed to a Revised
Proposed Final Judgment that settled the case

for ten tough conduct remedies to be imposed in the Microsoft
case.
5 Id.
6 See
7 Id.

Revised Proposed Final Judgment (Nov. 6, 2001).

at V(B) (emphasis added).

